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CHAPTER 19 
Workmen's Compensation 
MAURICE F. SHAUGHNESSY 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§19.1. Election of remedy. The doctrine of prejudice due to late 
filing of a claim was again considered during the 1966 SURVEY year by 
the Supreme Judicial Court in Leist's Case.1 On June 5, 1961, Clare 
Leist, the employee, fell and sustained injuries which admittedly arose 
out of and in the course of her employment. She reported the injury on 
the same day to her employer. She made no claim for compensation 
within six months of the injury under the Workmen's Compensation 
Act,2 as it then provided. Instead she commenced an action at law 
against the owner of the building where she fell. The action was 
started on December 4, 1961, but was discontinued on March 9, 1962. 
The employee, for the first time, on September 14, 1962, made a claim 
under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The Single Member found that the delay in making the claim for 
compensation "prejudiced the insurer in its rights to bring a third 
party suit within nine months," and dismissed the claim. The re-
viewing Board reversed this decision and awarded compensation. The 
insurer based its appeal from a decree of the Superior Court upholding 
the Board on the ground that it had been prejudiced as a matter of law 
by the interval of fifteen months between the date of injury and the 
date of claim. 
The claim of prejudice is not a novel defense. It has been discussed 
in previous years in the ANNUAL SURVEy.3 The insurer in the instant 
case relied on the provisions of Section 15 of Chapter 152 of the 
General Laws, which reads, in part, as follows: 
... the employee may at his option proceed either at law against 
... [the third party tortfeasor] to recover damages or against the 
insurer for compensation, ... but, except as hereinafter provided, 
not against both. If compensation be paid under this chapter, the 
insurer may enforce ... the liability of ... [the third party tort-
MAURICE F. SHAUGHNESSY is a partner in the firm of Parker, Coulter, Daly and 
White, Boston. 
§19.1. 1350 Mass. 465, 215 N.E.2d 662 (1966). 
2 G.L., c. 152, §41. Under Acts of 1965, c. 487, §1, the time for making the claim 
was extended to one year after the occurrence of the injury. 
3 See, for example, 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §20.4. 
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feasor], and if, in any case where the employee has claimed or 
received compensation within six months of the injury, the 
insurer does not proceed to enforce such liability within a period 
of nine months after said injury, the employee may so proceed .... 
An employee shall not be held to have exercised his option under 
this section to proceed at law if, at any time prior to trial of an 
action at law brought by him against ... [the third party tort-
feasor], he shall after notice to the insurer discontinue such action, 
provided that upon payment of compensation following such 
discontinuance the insurer shall not have lost its right to enforce 
the liability of such other person as hereinbefore provided. 
It should be here noted that the six- and nine-month limits have 
respectively been extended to one year and fifteen months.4 Briefly 
stated, the carrier's position was that it could not, in view of the 
decision in Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Ford Motor 
CO.,5 bring a third party action more than nine months after the date 
of injury. 
It is axiomatic that where an employee is injured in a situation that 
creates liability in some person other than the insured, the employee 
has an option to proceed at law against that person or to claim benefits 
under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but 
obviously he cannot do both.6 In Furlong v. Cronin,7 the Court said 
that the Legislature in enacting Section 15 intended to accomplish two 
objects: 
It intended (1) to compel the employee, or his administrator ... 
to make a final and binding election either to proceed at law 
against the person legally liable or to seek compensation under 
the act, and it intended (2) to preserve the cause of action at law 
for the benefit of the insurer, if the employee chose compensation, 
in order that the person legally at fault might not escape.8 
In Broderick's Case,9 the injured employee brought a personal injury 
action against a third party tort feasor and then discontinued that 
action subsequent to the running of the statute of limitations. He then 
sought to bring a claim for compensation, which was barred since his 
action precluded the insurer from bringing an action against the third 
party. In like manner, if the employee pursues his common law 
remedy, even though the result of an action establishes that there was 
no "legal liability" on the part of the third person, this is a bar to a 
proceeding to obtain workmen's compensation benefits.10 An employee 
4 Acts of 1965, c. 487, §IA. 
5335 Mass. 504, 140 N.E.2d 634 (1957), noted in 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§§28.3; 30.1. 
6 C.L., c. 152, §15. 
7305 Mass. 464, 26 N.E.2d 382 (1940). 
8Id. at 467, 26 N.E.2d at 384-385. 
9320 Mass. 149, 67 N.E.2d 897 (1946). 
10 Sciacia's Case, 262 Mass. 531, 160 N.E. 310 (1928). 
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who has commenced an action against a third person who caused the 
injury may discontinue the action at any time before trial and accept 
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act provided the 
employer's insurer has not then lost its right to enforce the liability of 
this third person.11 Prior to the 1929 amendment, the election to 
pursue the action at law was irrevocable. The 1929 amendment12 
established a procedure for revoking the election made when the writ 
was entered. 
The employee contended in Leist's Case, and the Court so held, that 
the Ford easelS construed the 1939 amendment to bar an insurer's 
action against the third party after nine months from the injury, only 
where the employee has claimed or received compensation within six 
months of the injury and the insurer has failed to proceed against the 
third party within a period of nine months from the injury. 
In the absence of certain dicta in the Ford case, it is unlikely that the 
appeal in Leist's Case would have been pursued. The Court, in Ford, 
said in part, "[W]e construe the nine month period as a limitation on 
the right of the insurer to bring the third party action."14 In Ford, if 
the Court had added to the above that the nine-months limitation 
applies only if the employee has claimed or in fact has received 
compensation, it would have better served the interests of the bar. 
§19.2. Payment pending appeal: Insufficient findings. The Su-
preme Judicial Court in Larrabee's Case l considered the sufficiency of 
the evidence in a death case as well as whether compensation must be 
paid even though the insurer had appealed the Superior Court decision 
to the Supreme Judicial Court. The case involved a claim by Larrabee's 
widow for workmen's compensation benefits for herself and minor 
children. The findings and decision by the Single Member awarding 
compensation were adopted by the Reviewing Board. In the Superior 
Court, a final decree was entered for the claimant. The Supreme 
Judicial Court also considered a companion case involving this same 
insurer's appeal from the decree of the Single Justice dismissing a 
petition brought by the insurer for suspension of the decree of the 
Superior Court ordering the payment of compensation pending the 
insurer's appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court. 
The claim for compensation was filed on May 3, 1958, alleging that 
on April 9, 1958, the employee died from the inhalation of noxious 
fumes in the employer's factory where there were inadequate ventila· 
tion facilities. There were nine hearings before the Single Member 
extending over a period in excess of four years. 
The employee had been in the employ of the company approxi-
mately seven years. His job involved the application of rubber and 
11 Reidy v. Old Colony Gas Co., 315 Mass. 631, 53 N.E.2d 707 (1944). 
12 Acts of 1929, c. 326, §1. 
18335 Mass. 504, 140 N.E.2d 634 (1957). 
14 Id. at 508, 140 N.E.2d at 637. 
§19.2. 1350 Mass. 305, 214 N.E.2d 456 (1966). 
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plastic to cloth. Strong odors were produced in the operation. On 
April 5, he complained to his supervisor of distress because of odors 
and fumes, but worked several more days and on April 9 was compelled 
to leave his place of employment early. On arriving home a physician 
was called, but before he arrived, the employee died. An autopsy was 
performed and the cause of death was listed as an acute liver insuffi-
ciency which developed between sixteen hours and four days before 
death. On the assumption that the employee had inhaled certain fumes 
at work, a Dr. Swatek, who performed the autopsy, gave the opinion 
that there was a direct causal relationship between the inhalation of 
chlorothene fumes and the liver damage. An internist called to testify 
for the claimant also testified with regard to causal relationship 
between the inhalation of the fumes and the liver injury. The em-
ployer produced two medical witnesses who testified to the contrary. 
Evidence was also produced by the employer that all of the materials 
were non-toxic and within the limits prescribed by state law. The 
Single Member found that the employee in his capacity as a feed man 
was the one most exposed to "whatever" odors and fumes emanated 
from the materials used and ordered the payment of compensation. 
Section 17 of Chapter 152 of the General Laws contains an unusual 
provision which states, in part, "Orders or decisions . . . shall have 
effect, notwithstanding an appeal, until it is otherwise ordered by a 
justice of the supreme judicial court, who may in any county, 
suspend or modify such decree ... during the pendency of the appeal." 
The employer sought suspension of the enforcement of the Superior 
Court decree in favor of the claimant. It alleged that the appeal 
involved a substantial question of law and that if the Supreme Judicial 
Court found in favor of the employer it would be difficult if not 
impossible to recover the amount of payments paid to the claimant. 
The petition for the suspension was dismissed. As was pointed out in 
Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Peloquin:2 "Matters that 
rest in the discretion of a single justice are not subject to review ... 
save in instances where an error has been committed so gross in its 
nature as to amount to an abuse and be an arbitrary exercise of power, 
or where equitable consideration in view of all the circumstances 
condemn its exercise."3 In Peloquin the Court stayed the decree since 
the insurer claimed a substantial defense at law. Also in Dempsey's 
Case,4 the Single Justice made an order suspending the decree from 
which an appeal was taken. Apart from these two cases and Larrabee, 
the Court has had no occasion to interpret Section 17 since the Work-
men's Compensation Act was adopted. The insurer in Larrabee was 
successful in having the Supreme Judicial Court recommit the case to 
the Industrial Accident Board for clarification of its findings and 
decision. It is paradoxical that the insurer could in effect win the battle 
2225 Mass. 30, 113 N.E. 574 (1916). 
3Id. at 30-31, 113 N.E. at 575. 
4230 Mass. 583, 120 N.E. 75 (1918). 
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and lose the war. In one part of the decision dealing with Section 17, 
the Court ordered the carrier to make payment of compensation in 
accordance with the Superior Court decree and later in the decision 
recommitted the entire case to the Board to determine what chlori-
nated drugs produced the destructive type of lesion in the liver. It is 
axiomatic that if there was sufficient evidence to pinpoint the exact 
chlorinated chemical causing the lesion, the Single Member would 
have done so in his original decision. 
There was considerable conflict in the medical testimony. The 
findings by the Board on a question of fact is final provided it is 
"supported by any evidence."5It is also well settled that the decision of 
the Review Board cannot be reversed unless required as a matter of 
law.6 Equally well established law is the proposition that the findings 
of the Board when supported by the evidence cannot be set aside, even 
though upon all the evidence a contrary conclusion might also be 
reached.7 The decisions of the Board on questions of fact stand on the 
same footing as a verdict of a jury or findings of a judge, and are not 
subject to review, except to determine whether there is any evidence to 
support them.8 In Cahill's Case,9 the Court pointed out that the Board 
must make specific and definite findings upon the evidence reported. 
In Larrabee it was the insurer's contention that the death of the 
employee did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. 
The burden is upon the claimant to prove both elements before he is 
entitled to recover compensation.1° The Court in remanding the case 
to the Board said that in the presence of conflicting medical opinion, a 
question was presented for the Single Member's judgment and he 
could choose to accept the explanation of the death which was prof-
fered by the claimant. The Court found, however, that the Single 
Member and the Board failed to designate what chlorinated chemical, 
if any, was inhaled and from what source it came. Not having identified 
the chemical at fault, the insurer was denied the opportunity to test a 
crucial basis of the decision for the claimant. The Court also noted that 
the Single Member ignored in his findings a large portion of the 
evidence, and that the findings made were ambiguous and insufficient. 
It, therefore, remanded the matter to the Board for clarification of its 
findings. 
§19.3. Medical testimony. In Smith's Case1 the Supreme Judicial 
Court approved the Industrial Accident Board's award of compen-
sation notwithstanding the absence of medical testimony. The facts as 
found by the Single Member and affirmed by the Board were that an 
5 McGowan's Case, 288 Mass. 441, 443, 193 N.E. 28, 29 (1934). 
6 Perangelo's Case, 277 Mass. 59, 62, 177 N.E. 892, 893 (1931). 
7 Wander's Case, 308 Mass. 157, 31 N.E.2d 530 (1941). 
8 Pigeon v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 216 Mass. 51, 102 N.E. 932 (1913). 
9295 Mass. 538, 4 N.E.2d 332 (1936). 
10 Flaherty'S Case, 316 Mass. 719, 56 N.E.2d 880 (1944). 
§19.3. 1349 Mass. 772, 211 N.E.2d 345 (1965). 
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employee while he was at work bending over and engaged in inspecting 
parts about fifteen feet from an open gas flame, suffered a pain in his 
back and lost consciousness. As a result of this, he sustained a laceration 
of the chin and other injuries. The parts on which he was working 
were on a bench two and one half to three feet high. He had been so 
engaged for approximately two hours in a room where the temperature 
was between eightly-five and ninety degrees. There was no direct 
medical testimony that this episode of syncope arose out of his em-
ployment, but the Single Member so found and this decision was 
upheld by the Reviewing Board. 
The insurer's position was that the decision of the Review Board was 
based on speculation, surmise, and conjecture as to the cause of the fall 
which resulted in the injuries and disability. It has always been held in 
this Commonwealth that injuries resulting from falls to the floor are 
not compensable unless there was a tripping, slipping, or striking of 
an implement of the employment while falling. 2 In Cinmino's Case,3 
the employee was standing near a bench, made an outcry, and fell, 
striking his head on the concrete floor. His skull was fractured and he 
died one week later. It was argued for the claimant widow that the 
cause of death was the concrete floor. But the Supreme Judicial Court 
stated that it made no difference whether the floor was concrete, hard 
wood, dirt, or soft wood; the widow could not recover because, 
although the injury occurred in the course of the employment, it was 
not a risk and hazard of the employment. Cinmino's Case has been 
cited with approval many times. Needless to say, the burden of proof 
rests upon the claimant on every point requisite to a recovery4 
Section 5 of Chapter 152 of the General Laws provides that process 
and procedure in workmen's compensation cases is to be simple and 
summary. The Court was probably considering this section when it 
enlarged the rule of Lovely'S Case. 5 Lovely worked for a bakery as a 
cook and dishwasher. While carrying a bag of sugar he felt a pain in his 
right side. Subsequently, the employee was operated on for a hernia. 
No medical testimony was offered in support of a claim that carrying 
a bag of sugar caused the hernia. The Court pointed out that H[m]edical 
testimony is highly desirable in all cases and its absence is a proper 
ground for concern."6 Notwithstanding the language in Lovely, the 
Court in Smith's Case disposed of the insurer's contention by stating: 
We are of [the] opinion that medical testimony was not required 
in this uncomplicated case where the single member might 
"reasonably be permitted to relate incapacity to a specific injury 
or incident as a matter of general human knowledge and ex-
2 Cinmino's Case, 251 Mass. 158, 146 N.E. 245 (1925). 
3 Ibid. 
4 Goddu's Case, 323 Mass. 397, 400, 82 N.E.2d 232, 234 (1948); Flaherty'S Case, 
316 Mass. 719, 56 N.E.2d 880 (1944). 
5336 Mass. 512, 146 N.E.2d 488 (1957), noted in 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§§20.2, 20.3, 22.1. 
6Id. at 515, 146 N.E.2d at 491. 
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perience and without resort to what in the absence of medical 
testimony might partake of speculation and conjecture."7 
Apart from Smith's Case and several others,S the Court has with 
some degree of uniformity required proof by direct medical testimony 
of causal relationship between the employment and the injury sus-
tained by the employee. Many other jurisdictions, however, are in 
accord with the rationale of Smith. It should be noted that these 
jurisdictions are far more liberal in defining "common knowledge." In 
a case under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act9 the court in Hampton Roads Stevedoring Corp. v. O'Hearne10 
said in part: "It is true there is no positive expert medical testimony to 
establish the finding that the injury caused the death but such is not 
required by law."l1 The court further pointed out, citing Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Marshall,12 that even when all the medical 
testimony is one way, the Deputy Commissioner is not bound by such 
medical testimony if there is other competent testimony requiring a 
finding different from that indicated by the medical testimony. Our 
sister state of Rhode Island has expressed its view on this matter in 
Valente v. Bourne Mills,13 which was a case in which the only evidence 
was the employee's testimony that she was struck on her left breast by 
a wooden bobbin and felt no pain until almost two weeks later. Sub-
sequently, she was operated upon for cancer. The court in sustaining 
the award of compensation stated that "[i]n a compensation case a 
party is not to be denied the benefit of a reasonable inference that 
logically and naturally arises from the evidence, especially if the 
testimony of the only witness is undisputed and unimpeached."14 The 
Colorado Supreme Court, in Industrial Commission of Colorado v. 
Havens,15 found that, even though there was no medical evidence 
introduced as to whether over exertion results in coronary occlusion, 
none was necessary, and affirmed the decision of the Commissioner 
holding the death of the employee to be compensable. In Pennsylvania, 
the court has held that medical testimony was unnecessary to prove a 
flame from a furnace could cause a subsequent cataract of the em-
ployee's eye.16 
It is evident that in cases of obvious injury when the usual conse-
quences of that injury are within the sphere of common knowledge 
7349 Mass. 772, 211 N.E.2d 345, 346 (1965). 
S Casey's Case, 348 Mass. 572, 204 N.E.2d 710 (1965), 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§18.7; Lovely's Case, !I!I6 Mass. 512, 146 N.E.2d 488 (1957); Harrington's Case, 285 
Mass. 69, 188 N.E. 499 (19!1!1). 
9!13 U.S.C. §§901-905 (1964). 
10184 F.2d 76 (4th Cir. 1950). 
11 Id. at 78. 
1257 F. Supp. 177 (W.D. Wash. 1944). 
1377 R.I. 274, 75 A.2d 191 (1950). 
14 Id. at 277-278, 75 A.2d at 19!1. 
15136 Colo. 111, !l14 P.2d 698 (1957). 
16 Saylor v. Greenville Steel Car Co., 157 Pa. Super. 331, 43 A.2d 633 (1945). 
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and experience of an administrative officer of a quasi-judicial board, 
this officer may use the cumulative reservoir of his own expert knowl-
edge in weighing and rejecting conflicting medical opinion. In the 
absence of medical testimony on behalf of the employee, the prudent 
insurer's attorney should recognize that the Supreme Judicial Court 
has been enlarging the concept of the common knowledge doctrine. In 
like manner, it should also be noted that if the employee's counsel does 
not present medical testimony and the Commissioner dismisses the 
claim, this decision could well be a question of fact not reviewable by 
the CourtP 
§19.4. Fees. Section 11 of Chapter 152 of the General Laws pro-
vides for the award of costs to the prevailing party. In joyce's Case, the 
insurer asked review of that portion of the Superior Court decree 
awarding to the employee the sum of one thousand dollars for fees and 
expenses in the Superior Court. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected 
the insurer's position and indicated they would not attempt to substi-
tute their judgment for that of the judge in the Superior Court. To 
this writer's knowledge, this is the highest award of costs and expenses 
to date under Section II of the Act and may well set a pattern for the 
future. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§19.5. Increase in weekly benefits for specified injuries. All bene-
fits under Section 36 of General Laws, Chapter 152, have been 
increased 25 per cent. 1 
§19.6. Application for discontinuance of compensation. In speci-
fied cases, the insurer must furnish to the employee or his attorney a 
copy of its application for discontinuance of compensation with recent 
medical reports supporting the application.1 This act amends Section 
29 of General Laws, Chapter 152. 
§19.7. Preliminary conference. Within 60 days after a request for 
hearing is filed with the Division of Industrial Accidents, a conference 
between the parties is to be held before a member of the Division for 
the purpose of defining and narrowing the issues. The issues as estab-
lished at this conference, except in unusual instances, will be binding 
upon the parties.! 
It is unfortunate that the General Court has enacted Chapter 443, 
which creates a new Section 7C of General Laws, Chapter 152. Pre-
sently the injured workman must wait nine months to one year for a 
hearing, and in the same manner the carrier must wait an equal length 
17 Mastrogiovanni's Case, 332 Mass. 228, 124 N.E.2d 246 (1955). 
§19.4. 1350 Mass. 77, 213 N.E.2d 235 (1966). 
§19.5. 1 Acts of 1966, c. 584. 
§19.6. 1 Acts of 1966, c. 442. 
§19.7. 1 Acts of 1966, 443. 
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of time for a hearing on the issue of present incapacity. By the enact-
ment of Chapter 443 the Legislature may have immeasurably pro· 
longed the waiting period, since in each case under the new enactment 
there must be the equivalent of a pre-trial conference. Consequently, 
it could well require the full time of one and quite possibly two 
members who could otherwise have been assisting in resolving the 
unconscionable backlog of cases. 
§19.8. Waiting period. Section 29 of General Laws, Chapter 152, 
has previously provided that no compensation is to be paid unless an 
employee is disabled for a period of at least seven days. A 1966 amend-
ment reduced the waiting period to five days.1 
§19.9. Coverage of elected or appointed officials. Prior to the 
enactment of Chapter 401 of the Acts of 1966, elected or appointed 
town officials could not be covered under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. Subject to acceptance by the city councilor town meeting, 
certain officials can come within the terms of the Act under the 
amendment to Section 69 of General Laws, Chapter 152. 
§19.10. Benefits. The maximum amount of weekly compensation 
under Sections 34, 34A and 35 of General Laws, Chapter 152, has been 
increased to $58 a week.1 
§19.11. Reimbursement for injury to disabled war veteran. Acts 
of 1965, Chapter 891, by amendment to General Laws, Chapter 152, 
§37 A, provides for reimbursement in certain cases from the special fund 
established by Section 65N. Previously, this reimbursement was in the 
amount of 50 per cent, but now Section 37 A provides "in an amount 
not to exceed 50 per cent." 
§19.8. 1 Acts of 1966, c. 578. 
§19.10. 1 Acts of 1965, 664, §§1, 2. 3. 
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